x86: properly handle hvm_copy_from_guest_{phys,virt}() errors
authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Mon, 30 Sep 2013 12:17:46 +0000 (14:17 +0200)
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Mon, 30 Sep 2013 12:17:46 +0000 (14:17 +0200)
commit6bb838e7375f5b031e9ac346b353775c90de45dc
tree9a3a447fa05f3e3462b8c1cbc279aa7229a4ca98
parent0a6b415d5212af68249ddf41a20dfc3998c8d670
x86: properly handle hvm_copy_from_guest_{phys,virt}() errors

Ignoring them generally implies using uninitialized data and, in all
but two of the cases dealt with here, potentially leaking hypervisor
stack contents to guests.

This is CVE-2013-4355 / XSA-63.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/intercept.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/realmode.c